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I.
Nobody may be permitted to victimize others to further their
own interests. There must be appropriate controls against those
who abuse their economic powers. Wealth is to be apportioned in
a just and reasonable way among those who helped to create it.
The spirit of mutual assistance is directed toward a welfare socie-
ty. We all accept these as sound principles without hesitation, and
each State makes efforts to translate them into reality. Yet these
efforts rarely transcend national boundaries. One out of every
four people on this earth lives in abject poverty with an income of
less than two hundred dollars a year. Half of all those who die
have succumbed to either starvation or malnutrition. But these
are the problems of other countries: we extend our sympathies
but not a truly helping hand.
In law school curricula domestic laws are omnipotent. Citizens
continue to worry and gloat as they are fed with data on the
economic achievement of their own country in the international
community. Since the eighteenth century, the concept of sover-
eignty has created in the global arena self-contained political units
whose reaction to the international community is constantly self-
oriented. The rise of nationalism, inspired by racial self-
determination, has exacerbated the situation and even today,
when mutual interdependence is a sine qua non for survival of any
State, this pattern continues unchanged. In fact, those areas
which were freed from colonial bonds after the World War II ap-
peared to the world to be proud of their sovereigns. It was not
questioned that each State was to have the absolute right to
establish policy to its liking, and to implement that policy within
its boundaries in the pursuit of national interests. Interference
with this power by other States was accordingly regarded as an
inexcusable intervention.
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II.
But nation-minded politicians have started to realize that they
are now confronted with a new partner in this international
system: a world-wide network of huge corporations with annual
sales greater than many nations' gross national products. It has
become increasingly apparent since 1970 that the operations of
these corporations could interfere with the smooth implementa-
tion of the policies of the State. For example, the world has
gradually learned that the application of conventional monetary
theories does not necessarily bring about the results expected by
the monetary authority of the State. National leaders began to
recognize the impact of the uncontrollable influence of some third
power.
The myth that goods are transferred in the international
market place mostly by way of trade, in accordance with the prin-
ciples of competition, has long since been destroyed. By the 1970's
the figure for the production and local sale of goods in foreign
countries by multinational corporations had, for the first time in
history, surpassed the figure for world trade. This fact alone
should prove that the traditional role of each nation's monetary
system in regulating the level of exports and imports is becoming
limited. Furthermore, even in the area of traditional trade, con-
siderations drawn from the global programs of multinational cor-
porations are becoming decisive factors in determining quantity
and prices. This is certainty a challenge to any national policy based
on Keynsian economics.
No doubt States have the power to control the activities of a
multinational corporation within their respective boundaries.
States may even control the foreign operations of domestic cor-
porations through their headquarters when those operations af-
fect the domestic economy. But no State can trespass upon the
sovereignty of another and seek to exert control within the
other's boundaries. Multinational corporations thrive upon the
unregulated interstices arising from the conflict of individual
policies among nations. Recognition of this fact has led interna-
tional agencies (particularly since 1970) to discuss means of ad-
dressing the problem. The crux of the problem is, of course, the
absence of effective regulation on a global scale.
Until recently, it was generally believed that private invest-
ment to developing countries could contribute to their industrial
development and raise their standard of living. It was thought that
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along with the fall of trade barriers, the liberalization of private in-
ternational investment would eliminate the unequal distribution
of wealth. But in the same way that economic aid by governments
is often not distinct from interest-oriented considerations of the
donor States, corporation investments are overwhelmingly made
in the pursuit of profits. At present, there is essentially a con-
tinuation of the bonds of the colonial days in that the old colony is
connected through private investment to the enterprises of the
old colonizer. The discrepancies of wealth between the North and
South are widening. In fact, the standard of living in many of the
non-oil-producing developing countries is even lower than in col-
onial days. Since the political and social freedom of the former col-
onies would be an empty concept without economic strength, it
was natural under these conditions for new nations to have re-
quested a more equal distribution of wealth and the imposition of
global regulations over international business activities.
III.
Corporations are the nucleus of free business activity and form
the fiber of capitalism. A corporation is a juridical person created
in accordance with the laws of the State which recognizes its
establishment. A multinational corporation is merely a collective
body of independent corporations; yet the activities of this
amalgam of juridical persons are controlled by the central
management. Though the parent and its subsidiaries may be
lumped together for the purposes of antitrust law or tax law, the
initial presumption upon which their unity is based is that they
are separate juridical persons. The economic concept of the enter-
prise does not exist in the world of jurisprudence.
The company law presently found in Western States is a
system which was initially designed to foster the economic growth
of industrial nations under capitalism. In pre-World War II days, a
nation could comfortably confine its corporate regulation to the
protection of shareholders and the promotion of efficient manage-
ment of its domestic companies because world markets were ex-
panded mostly through trade and international investment, if any,
was seldom direct. There may indeed have been a time in the past
when companies did in fact operate as independent economic en-
tities. At present, however, there is a large gap between the socio-
logical and economic concept of the enterprise, and the corres-
ponding legal concept.
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Of course each nation is free to determine rights and duties and
their qualifications. For example, where a one-man company for-
mula is utilized to limit liability and avoid taxes, or where sub-
sidiaries are created to enable illicit manipulation of accounting or
evade antitrust laws, the State would have no difficulty in dealing
with them, provided these phenomena occur within the territory
of the State. In this way, at least until 1950, each State could effec-
tively implement its policy. However, the pervasive atmosphere
favoring free capital movements and direct investment after the
war resulted in the emergence of many companies established
under local law with foreign capital. They were only component
parts of foreign enterprises whose decisions as to price, quantity
and destination in regard to production, imports and exports were
controlled from outside the territory. But, on the other hand, local
law continued to treat such companies as independent entities
subject to all local rights and duties. Treating a company as an in-
dependent entity operating within the social fabric in the same
way as a natural person, capable of enforcing rights and bearing
duties, still remains the starting point for jurisprudence. This prob-
lem may have arisen from the fatal reality that there is no such
thing as an international right or duty for transnational commer-
cial activities. Whenever we talk of rights and duties in commer-
cial settings, our reference is always directed to such rights and
duties recognized under the applicable national law.
Global economic activities are closely tied. Many international
businesses operate without territory. Nevertheless the present
world legal scheme in determining rights and duties of a commer-
cial nature treats even the largest international enterprise as a
group of individual juridical persons recognized under the laws of
nations. Each State continues to cope with them in this outmoded
fashion, and denounces interference by the central managements
of multinational corporations as evil. But who could not have im-
agined that with divergent domestic laws on the one hand and the
international call for free direct investment on the other, the
oligopolization of world markets by big business would have
resulted.
IV.
Nations impose taxes according to some tax policy. Revenues
from taxation on profits earned from international activities are
not necessarily shared proportionately among the nations where
552 [Vol. 9:549
1979] SOVEREIGNTY AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 553
part of those profits are earned. Apart from some bilateral
treaties, there are no international arrangements regulating the
scope within which one nation may impose taxes. Each nation has
complete freedom, pursuant to its sovereignty, to determine
which activities it will tax. The possibilities are quite broad. In the
end, each State's tax policy differs according to such factors as its
international status, its economic and foreign policies, and other
available sources of revenue. Nor are there uniform international
accounting standards. International businesses constantly utilize
their world-wide network to alter the tax revenues of a nation.
If revenues obtained from the taxation of profits derived from
international operations are to be shared among nations, they
must be divided equitably, without financial manipulations by
enterprises. Nations such as the United States and Japan, with
relatively similar economic backgrounds, can reach agreements on
methods of taxation and on tax sharing. But many nations are not
in such a position. The parade of individual tax systems
engendered by the concept of absolute sovereignty is a large
obstacle to any equitable distribution of tax revenues. As early as
1929 the League of Nations drafted an all-but-ignored model tax
treaty designed to promote equal distribution of tax revenues in
cases where the sales activities or corporate assets were located in
more than one State. The United Nations has undertaken similar
tasks for many years, without success and for the same reasons.
Nations with large amounts of direct investment such as the
United States, England, France, West Germany and Japan, all
have their own unique tax systems which reflect their national
policies. One common characteristic is lenient tax treatment of
overseas activities. This opens the door for multinational corpora-
tions to engage in widespread management and bookkeeping
manipulations, together with the utilization of those tax-haven
States which take more than ample advantage of the sovereignty
doctrine. As already witnessed recently in the United States, the
implementation of tax policies of individual nations which are
restricted by their territorial limitation would someday prove to
be totally ineffective against global business activities.
V.
Many nations seek to insure the healthy development of
economic activities by restricting unfair trade restraints and prac-
tices. Approaches vary, but all the Western nations have adopted
some form of regulations controlling private economic activities.
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It is inevitable that in developing such regulations, the nation's
economic and political policy, both domestic and international, is
reflected. However, in today's world, economic interdependence is
unavoidable. If nations opt for the use of arbitrary power based on
the right of sovereignty and narrow self-interest, economic coex-
istence could be easily disrupted due to'the lack of any effective
means of adjustment on a global scale. To maintain co-existence
and promote prosperity, nations must agree to a certain degree of
international order, while repressing self-interested motives and
understanding that in the long run this is the most profitable
course.
The GATT Agreement, for example, was adopted due to just
this kind of consensus, which held that the protection of free trade
contributed to the development of international economic pros-
perity. When it was adopted in 1947, however, most of the
developing countries were not yet independent and, of the twenty-
three original signatories, two-thirds were advanced nations; the
African continent was represented only by South Africa and
Rhodesia. The North-South problem was not a central issue. It
was only in 1965, immediately after the establishment of UNC-
TAD, that GATT incorporated the famous Part Four, entitled
"Trade and Development," which reflected the interests of
developing countries. Part Four encouraged preferential tariffs
for imports from the developing countries, and permitted con-
certed action with regard to the international sale of primary com-
modities.
To develop the world economy through free trade, it was
necessary that fair competition be preserved. When developing
nations competed in the export of manufactured goods with ad-
vanced industrial nations, they were often at an obvious disadvan-
tage. To eliminate this handicap and raise the position of developing
nations to some sort of parity, the GATT revision allowing relative
tariff preferences moved -theoretically -in the right direction.
This revision also ultimately promoted the overall purpose of
GATT because expansion of the international market required im-
provement of the economic status of developing countries, through
encouragement of industrialization.
Ironically, at the time preferential tariff reductions were sug-
gested, the high tariff era of GATT's inaugural days had long
since passed and the Kennedy Round for radical tariff reductions
was in full swing. As witnessed in the succeeding Tokyo Round, a
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newera began where the emphasis was no longer on reduction of
tariffs. Consequently, the actual effect of preferences was slight
and temporary. Worse still, the profits generated by these
preferential tariffs were to end up in the coffers of multinational
corporations whose subsidiaries were located in developing coun-
tries. Moreover, this preferential tariff scheme could have been
used as a weapon by a developed nation to force establishment of
closer economic affiliation. At any rate, the general ineffec-
tiveness of the scheme meant that other approaches for spurring
economic development were needed. The 1965 GATT amendment
itself included another major component-authorization of certain
concerted actions with regard to primary commodities. But it was
UNCTAD which promoted this reform, not the Western-oriented
GATT. As already indicated, it must also be remembered that
since 1970 the international transfer of goods is no longer primari-
ly conducted by trade.
VI.
Under present international law, it is entirely up to the sover-
eign decision of each State which political system it chooses and
which policies it implements. So long as a matter remains essen-
tially domestic, interference with this decision by other nations is
a trespass. The United Nations Charter advocates appropriate in-
ternational measures for matters of international concern (arts.
1(1)(3), 14, 55 and 66), but it also announces quite clearly in article
2(7) that essentially domestic matters are not to be interfered with
by other nations. Today, however, most of the actions taken by a
nation affect international society one way or another, and purely
domestic problems are becoming rare. Thus, sanctions on South
Africa have been justified because of the substantial political im-
pact on other African States of its discrimination policy. But this
is an exception. Many of the reported serious violations of human
rights in other nations are left undisturbed because they are
essentially domestic in scope. Meanwhile, the international com-
munity consoles its conscience by adopting abstract human rights
documents. The determination as to whether a matter is of inter-
national concern appears in reality to be left entirely to either
unilateral action or high level diplomatic and political decisions by
a group of States. Delegates representing governments are duty-
bound to be faithful to governmental interests, which by their
nature oppose any move toward decentralization of powers. The
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concept of absolute sovereignty preserves the old notion that the
King doeth no wrong.
In establishing economic policy, myopic domestic political con-
siderations prove much more important than considerations based
on any long-range global perspective. For example, politicans are
attracted to import restrictions because this is one of the rare
areas where the interests of labour and management correspond,
particularly when the issue of unemployment is a hot domestic
concern. Attainment of efficiency by means of an international
division of labor remains a utopian notion. Certainly there was
great enthusiasm for free trade until recently. But now that neo-
Machiavellism appears resurgent, it seems that the maintenance
of free-trade was never more than a mere coincidence, caused by
the parallel direction of self-oriented decisions by individual
States. The contradiction of sovereign units promotes the confron-
tation of the workers of the world. This pressure is constantly
reflected in each nation's policies, both domestic and international.
The Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States
adopted by the United Nations in 1974 provides, in addition to
calling for permanent sovereignty over natural resources, that
every State has the right "to nationalize, expropriate or transfer
ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate compen-
sation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking
into account its relevant laws and regulations and all cir-
cumstances that the State considers pertinent." (art. 2(2)(c)) (em-
phasis supplied). It is apparent that the tone of this provision
favors unilateral determinations by the seizing State. The recogni-
tion by the United Nations of the concept of permanent sovereign-
ty over natural resources further justified unilateral determina-
tions of appropriate compensation, particularly when the object of
nationalization relates to natural resources. Adoption of this pro-
vision was a high-tide of developing country unity, occurring im-
mediately after the success of the OPEC cartel. It was a confron-
tation between the North and South backed by the strange con-
cept of sovereignty. People as such were ignored.
The fundamental contradiction of this approach was revealed
when the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea pro-
ceeded on the belief that natural resources on the sea-bed under
the high seas are the common heritage of mankind. If global co-
operation towards an equitable distribution of wealth to human
beings and not to nations is truly to be attained, it is arguable that
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energy supplies should not be an exception. Putting aside the
issue of whether the current world depression began with the oil
crisis, it is questionable whether this trend of confrontation,
calculated in terms of State interests in maintaining or increasing
shares of global wealth, would ultimately benefit the world popu-
lation.
VII.
The present confused scheme for world order has been main-
tained under the jurisprudential concept of sovereignty. This con-
cept arose in eighteenth-century Europe, when the world con-
sisted only of European Christian nations of similar background.
The concept certainly did contribute to the maintenance of order.
It once had raison d 'tre in the context of the old world, but the world
has ever since changed radically. It was unfortunate that the self-
oriented inclination of human races, both North and South, sus-
tained the belief in sovereignty under the slogans of nationalism
and the maintenance of national interests. The call for the New In-
ternational Economic Order may certainly be a step forward for a
fairer distribution of wealth. But it is still nothing more than a
patch-work within the existing framework, and does not truly
eliminate the root evil.
Apart from dreams for a unified world, there is a strong and en-
couraging current of philosophy holding that territorial sovereign-
ty should be transformed into functional sovereignty. The tradi-
tional distinction between domestic laws and international laws
must also be questioned. For example, in the field of traditional
conflict-of-laws, we are told that the relevant laws come from na-
tional legislatures; hence some choice is necessary. Yet the
authorities who imposed this premise ignore the existence of a lex
mercatoria during the medieval age which knew no boundary for
its application, and do not tell us how all transnational transac-
tions became under the control of national laws. In the administra-
tion-oriented economic law field, we must also realize that the
adherence to ego-influenced exercises of sovereignty will only fur-
ther confusion and confrontation in a world of interdependence.
This is an observation which need not be restricted to the present
North-South confrontation.

